The Commercial Court found that the declaratory legal protection procedure before the English court was governed by the jurisdiction clause of the ISDA-Masteragrement, since this clause was not superseded or limited by the clearly competing Italian jurisdiction clause in the financing agreement (see trial decision). This is despite a provision in the master agreement`s timetable that, in the event of a conflict between the terms of the ISDA`s governing contract and those of the funding agreement, they should “predominate where appropriate”. You will find more information in our blog: High Court holds the jurisdiction clause ISDA surpasses the competing jurisdiction clause in a separate but related agreement. In 2008, a banking consortium led by the complainant bank entered into a loan agreement (financing contract) with TRM, an Italian public-private partnership, to finance the construction of a power plant. The financing agreement was under Italian law and contained a jurisdiction clause in favour of the Italian court. The decision contains some useful guidance on the approach to contract interpretation of the ISDA master contract and the 2000 definitions. The Tribunal found that: While a strict approach to clarity, security and predictability is required in interpreting the terms of standard market agreements, all issues relating to the inclusion and modification of these provisions must be interpreted in accord with recognized principles of general treaty interpretation, such as. B inwood (respondent) v Capita Insurance Services Limited (appeal) [2017] UKSC 24 (see our litigation blog). The defendant denounced the applicant`s UFX account, the applicant claimed that the defendant had done so wrongly and had received compensation from the English High Court for the loss of its freehold positions in bitcoin.
Subsequently, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the English High Court by referring to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Cypriot courts under the terms of sale (and referring to Article 25 of the brussels regulation overhaul). TRM submitted that a distinction had been made between guarantees and companies (which it accepted, which could give rise to a contractual estoppel) and, on the other hand, recognition or representation. As far as the latter is concerned, “there is no agreement”, so that recognition/representation cannot create contractual Estoppel. TRM referred to Leggatt LJ`s decision in First Tower, in which he questioned whether a clause simply stating that a party “recognizes” that it did not enter into the contract on the basis of representation could lead to a contractual estoppel.
